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Abstract
This paper analyses the effects of the recent Finnish income tax reform on the behaviour
of a closely held corporation (CHC) and its owners. The main elements of the reform are
cuts in corporate and capital income tax rates and the replacement of the current full
imputation system by a partial double taxation of distributed profits. Considerable
exemptions are applied to relieve the taxation of dividends from CHCs. The analysis
indicates that the change in the CHCs cost of capital depends on the marginal tax rate
(MTR) of the owner. In the case of a high-MTR entrepreneur, the cost of capital increases
or is retained at the present level, while at lower MTRs the cost of capital may well
decrease. The latter observation is due to the increase in the tax rate gap between earned
income and capital income. Thus the reform does not remove the earlier reported non-
neutralities of the Finnish tax system. The reform will also affect the owner’s choice of the
form of compensation. Higher taxation of dividends will improve the position of wage
income as a form of compensation. This will cushion the effect of the dividend tax changes
on the CHCs cost of capital.
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11 Introduction
In January 2005 a tax reform bill became effective in Finland and introduced important changes to
the taxation of dividends and corporate profits. Since the previous major reform in 1993, Finnish
income taxation has followed the lines of the Nordic dual income tax (DIT). All personal capital
income and corporate profits have been taxed at a flat tax rate, in recent years 29 per cent, and all
earned income (wages, social benefits etc.) has been subject to a traditional progressive tax rate
schedule. A full imputation system has been applied to the taxation of distributed profits.
The recently adopted reform lowers the tax rate on corporate profits from 29 to 26 per cent and the
personal capital income tax rate from 29 to 28 per cent.  Perhaps the most important change,
however, is the replacement of the full imputation system by a partial double taxation of distributed
profits. This change has major implications for the income tax code and also individual as well as
firm behaviour.
Most of the elements of the reform are attributable to the changes in the European tax environment
in recent years. These developments include the ongoing decrease in corporate tax rates and the low
tax rates of the new EU Member States. The European institutions have also adopted a tougher
stance towards national dividend tax systems that give relief on dividends received from domestic
sources only. In recent rulings and communications, the European Court of Justice and the
European Commission have regarded such practices as discriminatory (European Commission
2003).
Small business taxation has received much attention in the Nordic tax policy debate in recent years.
One of the focuses of this debate has been the dual income tax system. To avoid tax planning and
tax avoidance, especially by entrepreneurs, induced by the wide tax rate gap between capital income
and earned income, the Nordic countries adopted rules under which entrepreneurial income is
divided into capital income and earned income on an estimated basis. In Finland, and in Sweden
and Norway, the profits of a sole proprietor and dividends from a closely held corporation (CHC)
are split into the two income types by categorizing the entrepreneur’s capital income as an imputed
return on the firm’s assets and interpreting the residual of income as earned income.
Economic effects of these tax systems have been analysed in several studies.  Hagen and Sörensen
(1998) examined the potential effects of the splitting system on the entrepreneur’s tax planning and
investment decisions. Kari (1999) and Lindhe et al. (2002) showed formally the dependence of the
firm’s cost of capital on the parameters of the splitting system and on the tax rate difference
between the MTR on earned income and the flat rate on capital income. They also showed that
different ways of implementing the splitting system lead to diverging incentive effects. One crucial
feature is how the capital base of the split is defined. In Finland the capital base corresponds to the
firm’s current net assets. The Finnish system tends to lead to high investment incentives for high
MTR entrepreneurs (Kari 1999). Sweden defines the capital base as the acquisition cost of shares.
Under this method the potential incentive effects only concern investments financed by new share
issues. Under the current tax parameters, however, the effect seems to be small (Lindhe et al. 2004).
While the Swedish and Finnish net asset-based splitting systems only affect equity-financed
investment, the Norwegian system, with gross business assets as the capital base, may also distort
investment financed by debt. Lindhe et al. (2004) argue that this effect may be considerable in
Norway.
In the case of an entrepreneur, wages and dividends are easily interchangeable as forms of
remuneration that the entrepreneur withdraws from the firm. The main distinguishing feature may
2be taxation. Fjærli and Lund (2001) analyse forms of remuneration under DIT using Norwegian
micro data. They find out that the taxation indeed motivates the type of payout from firms to owners
strongly but no uniquely.1 Lindhe et al. (2002 and 2004) stress that the owner’s choice of the form
of remuneration should be taken into account, when the effects of tax rules on the firm’s cost of
capital are analysed. The reason is that the tax treatment of the optimal marginal form of
remuneration determines the personal-level tax parameters relevant for the firm’s cost of capital.
This income form is in fact also the source from which the firm finances its internally financed
investments.
Most of the existing analysis on the implications of the Nordic dual income tax systems has been
carried out in a deterministic framework. An essential feature of DIT is, however, its non-linearity,
which may have important effects on behaviour in an uncertain environment. Thus, a deterministic
model  is  perhaps  not  the  most  appropriate  framework  to  analyse  the  effects  of  DIT.  One  related
issue concerns the choice of the imputed rate. The question is, whether the rate should reflect an
equity risk premium to grant neutrality. This issue is important since the deterministic analyses have
shown the size of the special investment incentive of DIT to be sensitive to the difference between
the imputed rate and the owner’s rate of return requirement. (Lindhe et al. 2004.) Some studies, like
Hagen and Sörensen (1998) and Sörensen (2003), advocate the view that, under certain conditions,
no or only a small risk premium may be needed to produce neutrality.2 This view may be
interpreted to give some indirect support to the assumptions applied in deterministic studies.
Surprisingly little analysis has been carried out on the effects of the DIT and splitting methods on
the career choice of potential entrepreneurs and on the entry investment and growth of small
businesses. Kari (1999) and Lindhe et al. (2002) touch on the issue of incentives for initial
investment. Using the nucleus model by Sinn (1991), they argue that the splitting system raises the
investment threshold for a start-up investment compared to a tax system with a flat capital income
tax rate and no income-splitting into capital and earned income. Kanniainen et al. (2004) derive an
opposing result in a different framework and suggest that the splitting system lowers the cost of
capital during a test investment period of a start-up firm.
This paper analyses the effects of the recent Finnish tax reform on tax planning and investment
incentives in CHCs using a deterministic framework. The focus is on how the introduction of the
new dividend tax system with different types of reliefs affects the owner’s choices between
dividends  and  wages  as  forms  of  remuneration,  and,  given  these  choices,  how  the  incentives  to
invest are changed. A simple static indifference condition approach is used to derive the firm’s cost
of capital. The analysis centres on how the new dividend tax rules interact with the special incentive
effects of the splitting system.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of the pre- and
post-reform  tax  treatment  of  a  CHC’s  profits  in  Finland.  Section  3  analyses  the  owner’s  choices
between wages and dividends. Section 4 derives the cost of capital formulae for a CHC in different
cases and discusses the channels through which the reform affects them. In the same section
numerical calculations are also presented. Section 5 concludes.
1 Entitlement to social security benefits may be another.
2 There is a larger literature on the investment neutrality of another tax system also based on imputed income, the so
called ACE -tax system. See Fane (1987), Bond and Devereux (1995), Panteghini (2001), Sörensen (2003) and Bond
and Devereux (2003).
32 Pre- and post-reform tax treatment of CHCs in Finland
In this chapter we first describe the central features of the pre-reform tax system with the emphasis
on the taxation of entrepreneurial income. Then we summarise the elements of the reform. A
summary of the changes is presented in Table 1. Finally we explain how social security
contributions are determined for entrepreneurs.
Pre-reform tax system
Since 1993 Finnish income taxation has been based on the Nordic DIT model. The net amount after
allowable expenses of all types of capital income such as dividends, capital gains and rental income
is taxed as one unified income type at a flat tax rate, which since January 2000 has been 29 per
cent.3 All  other income (wages,  salaries,  pensions and social  security benefits  etc.)  is  classified as
earned income and the net amount after deductions is taxed according to a progressive income tax
schedule. The total tax liability on earned income consists of several parts. Church tax, local income
tax and sickness insurance contributions are paid at flat rates, while national income tax is
progressive. The total top MTR on earned income is around 54.92 per cent (in 2004). Thus, the tax
rate difference between the top MTR and the proportional rate on capital income is considerable,
close to 26 percentage points. Below the threshold of national income tax (11 700 euros), income
earners pay only flat-rate taxes at an average rate of 20.92 per cent (2004). There is an additional
social security contribution paid by wage earners on wage income.
Since 1990 Finland has applied the full imputation system to relieve the double taxation of
distributed profits. Since the 1993 tax reform, the system has led to a zero effective tax rate on
dividends (taxed as capital income) at the shareholder level, due to equal tax rates on corporate
profits and capital income. Capital gains are taxed as ordinary capital income at a rate of 29 per
cent. The base is the selling price minus the acquisition cost and other costs without any indexation.
The so-called presumed acquisition cost may however reduce the effective level of taxation in some
cases. This arrangement means that, as an alternative to realised costs, the taxpayer may deduct a
so-called presumed acquisition cost, which is 50 per cent of the selling price for long-term gains
(>10 years).
Personal net wealth is taxed in Finland at a rate of 0.9 per cent. The tax base is fairly narrow. Most
types of interest-bearing assets are excluded from it and only 70 per cent of the value of corporate
shares in quoted firms is calculated into the owner’s taxable gross wealth. Similarly, the assets of a
closely held firm are assessed at only 30 per cent of their current value for taxation purposes.
Entrepreneurial income from small businesses is divided into capital income and earned income.
This income split concerns the profits of sole proprietors and partnerships as well as dividend
income received from CHCs. The capital base used to calculate the imputed return (capital income
part) is the net assets invested by the owner and includes both the original capital input and the
retained profits of the firm. In the case of a CHC, the portion of dividends taxable as capital income
is calculated as a 13.5 per cent return on the firm’s net assets. In Finland, unlike Norway and
Sweden, the split concerns not only CHCs but all other domestic corporations not quoted on the
main list of the Helsinki Stock Exchange. Similarly, the split is applied not only to dividends
received by the so-called active owners, as in Sweden and Norway, but to all individuals receiving
dividends from the non-quoted firm (Lindhe et al. 2003 and 2004).
3 The uniform tax rate on corporate profits and personal capital income was 25 per cent in 1993–95 and 28 per cent in
1996–99. Interest income is subject to a final withholding tax, the tax rate being the capital income tax rate.
4The Finnish reform
The Finnish corporate and capital income tax reform, which was voted by Parliament in June 2004
and became effective as from January 2005, contains the following changes:
· The corporate tax rate and capital income tax rate are lowered from 29 per cent to 26 and
28 per cent, respectively.
· The full imputation system is abandoned. As a rule, 70 per cent of personal dividend
income is counted as taxable capital income. Dividends from non-quoted corporations,
however, are tax-exempt up to 90,000 euros. Any amount exceeding this threshold is
taxed according to the main rule.
· The splitting of dividends into capital and earned income portions is retained. The scope
of the splitting system is slightly narrowed. The split concerns corporations not listed on
any exchange list, including the OTC list. The rate of the imputed return is lowered to 9
per cent.
· Of the total of dividends exceeding the imputed return on net assets (maximum amount of
capital income), again 70 per cent is taxed as the recipient’s earned income.
· The net wealth tax rate is lowered from 0.9 to 0.8 per cent and the threshold is raised from
185,000 to 250,000 euros. 4 There is a further source of relief which links capital income
tax and wealth tax. Capital income tax paid on dividends exceeding the 90,000 euro
threshold can be deducted from the net wealth tax.
· Other elements are the exemption in corporate taxation of capital gains received from
sales of shares in other corporations. Further, the rate at which the presumed acquisition
cost of long-term capital gains is calculated is lowered from 50 to 40 per cent. The
outcome is that the effective tax rate on long-term gains rises despite the reduction in the
legal tax rate.
Tax Parameter Pre-reform Regime Post-reform Regime
Statutory Tax Rate on Corporate Income tf 29 26
Personal Tax Rate on Capital Income tc 29 28
Rate of Imputation u 29 0 (partial relief)
Personal Tax Rate on Capital Gains tg 29 28
Personal Tax Rate on Net Wealth tnw 0.9 0.8
Personal Tax Rate on Earned Income5 te 54.92 54.92
Presumptive Rate of Capital Income6 b 9.585 9
Valuation of Assets for Net Wealth Tax a 30 30
Table 1. Summary of the pre- and post-reform tax parameters (%).
4 In December 2004 the Finnish government announced of a decision to remove the net wealth tax altogether. This
change will come into force as from January 2006. This study focuses on the reform package accepted in June 2004.
5 Top marginal rate in 2004. The range of state income tax: 0 % < 11700 euros, 11 % 11700-14500, 15 % 14500-20200,
21 % 20200-31500, 27 % 31500-55800 and ³ 55800 34 %. The municipal income tax is 18.12 % on average and the
church tax is 1.3 % on average. The employees’ sickness insurance contribution is 1.5 %.
6 The Finnish tax code defines the rate as 13.5 per cent under the old system. This rate gives the maximum amount of
gross dividend (cash dividend + imputation credit) taxable as capital income. Its cash dividend equivalent rate,
comparable with the 9 per cent rate of the new system, is 9.585 per cent.
5Social security contributions
The employer’s social security contributions on the entrepreneur’s wage income depend on whether
the owner is registered under the employees’ pension system (TEL) or the self-employed persons’
pension system (YEL). The entrepreneur comes under the YEL scheme when he (with his family)
owns more than 50 per cent of the CHC’s shares.
Social Security Contribution YEL TEL
National Pension Insurance
Employers                   I
                                    II
                                    III
1.35*
3.55*
4.45*
1.35*
3.55*
4.45*
Sickness Insurance
   Employers 1.614 1.614*
Pension Insurance
   Employers
   Employees
21.4
0
21.59, 16.9–24.0*
4.6*
Unemployment Insurance
   Employers
   Employees
0
0
0.6, 2.5*
0.25*
Soc. Sec. Contribution on the Actual Wage
   Employers
   Employees 1.35–4.45*
0
20.464–32.564*
4.85*
* The base of the contribution is the actual wage.
Table 2. Summary of social security contributions in 2004 (%).
In the case of a YEL owner, the employer’s pension contribution is calculated on the so-called YEL
wage.  The  YEL  wage  is  stipulated  in  the  contract  between  the  entrepreneur  and  the  pension
insurance company and because of this it is not directly connected to the actual wage of the owner.
The  YEL  owner  may  deduct  the  contribution  either  from  the  firm’s  corporate  tax  base  or  his
personal earned income tax base – depending on whether the firm or the owner pays the
contribution. Under the TEL system, the employer’s pension contribution is paid based on the
actual wage. The rate of the TEL contribution depends positively on the number of employees.
A TEL owner  is  also  liable  to  pay  personal  pension  contributions  and  progressive  unemployment
insurance contributions on his personal wage. These contributions are deductible from his personal
earned income. The YEL owner does not pay these contributions.
The employer’s social security contributions also include the national pension insurance
contribution and the sickness insurance contribution. The sickness insurance contribution is 1.614
per cent and the national pension insurance contribution is 1.35–4.45 per cent, depending on the
size and capital intensity of the firm.7 In the case of a YEL owner, the sickness insurance
contribution is based on the YEL wage and the national pension insurance contribution on the
actual wage.
7 Class I: depreciation < 50.500 euros and < 10 % of wages; class II: depreciation > 50.500 euros and 10–30 % of
wages; class III: depreciation > 50.500 euros and > 30 % of wages.
6The above description implies that only the national pension contribution of a YEL owner is based
on the actual wage. Other contributions are calculated on the fixed YEL wage. This means that only
the national pension contribution should be included in the entrepreneur’s marginal tax rate on wage
income. In the case of a TEL owner, on the other hand, all social security contributions are based on
the actual wage and thus increase the marginal tax rate.
3 Owner’s choice between wages and dividends
Wages and dividends may be close substitutes as forms of remuneration that the entrepreneur can
withdraw from the firm. In this section we analyse the owner’s choice between the two income
types under the assumption that the choice is solely grounded on tax considerations.
3.1 The model
To  analyse  the  owner’s  choice,  assume  a  CHC  that  earns  an  operating  profit p and  spends  it  on
investments, I, or on remuneration to the owner-entrepreneur in the form of wages W or dividends
D. On wages the firm is liable to pay employer’s social security contributions at the rate sf . Wages
are deductible when the firm’s taxable profit is calculated. Corporate income tax is paid at the rate
tf . The firm’s budget constraint is:
(1) [ ]WsDWsI fff )1()1( +-++++= ptp .
The  owner  thus  receives  remuneration  either  as  wages  or  dividends.  On  wage  income  the  owner
pays income tax at the effective rate tw and on dividends an amount of TD determined according to
the rules of the splitting system. The owner’s net income is
(2) NWDw TTDWNI --+-= )1( t ,
where TNW is net wealth tax. The effective MTR on wage income tw comprises the MTR on earned
income te and the employee’s social security contribution sw: tw = te + (1 – te)sw.
The net wealth tax is calculated as
(3) aNT nwNW
*t= ,
where tnw* is the wealth tax rate and a is a valuation parameter taking values between (0,1) and
reflecting the deviation of the taxable value of assets from their current value. N is current value of
the net assets of the firm. The value of tnw* depends on whether marginal net wealth tax is paid (see
Chapter 4).
The pre- and post-reform tax on dividends under the Finnish splitting system can be written as
follows:
(4)
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7where te* and tc* are the personal-level effective marginal tax rates on cash dividend from the firm
and b is the presumptive rate of return. ‘Effective’ here means that the tax rate takes into account
the imputation credit in the pre-reform regime and the partial exemption of dividends under the
post-reform regime. Equation (4) implies that dividend income is taxed up to the amount of bN, as
capital income (normal dividend) and the amount exceeding the threshold is taxed as earned income
(excess dividend).
Table 3 defines the effective tax rates under the pre- and post-reform regimes. u denotes the rate of
imputation credit and equals the corporate tax rate tf under the pre-reform regime. te is the MTR on
earned income and tc is the tax rate on capital income.
Regime Tax Rate tc* Tax Rate te*
Pre-reform
u
uc
-
-
1
t
u
ue
-
-
1
t
Post-reform
bN £ 90000
bN > 90000
0
0.7tc 0,7te
Table 3. Personal-level effective tax rates under pre- and post-reform regimes.
Table 4 gives numerical values for tc* and te*. Under the pre-reform regime the imputation credit
eliminates the personal-level tax burden on dividends taxed as capital income. The effective MTRs
on dividends taxable as earned income are positive at the assumed marginal tax rates te. Under the
post-reform system tc* is either zero or 19.6 per cent, depending on whether dividends exceed the
90,000 euro threshold. Also, at the level of the top tax rate on earned income, the 70 per cent rule of
the post-reform regime leads to a fairly similar effective MTR as in the imputation system. At lower
values of te the new rule leads to a higher effective MTR, however.
Table 4. Numerical values of the effective tax rates (%).
Tax Rate te*Regime Tax Rate tc*
MTR on Earned Income te
       34.92               54.92
Pre-reform 0 8.3 36.5
Post-reform
bN £ 90000
bN > 90000
0
19.6
24.4 38.4
83.2 Dividend vs. wage income
The owner’s choice between dividend and wage income is analysed here by first solving the firm’s
budget equation (1) with respect to the owner’s wage income, which gives:
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By inserting W from (5) and the tax equations from (3) and (4) into the owner’s net income (2), we
obtain
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Now  let  us  consider  the  effect  of  a  small  change  in  dividend  income D on net income NI while
keeping the profit constant. We obtain
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In the pre-reform regime the multiplier term, denoted here byYpre, reduces to
(8) Ypre  =
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and is positive with sf  + sw > 0. Thus an increase in dividends at the expense of wages increases the
owner’s net income. This means that in the pre-reform system dividends are the tax-preferred form
of remuneration assuming that part of the compensation is taxed as earned income. The main factor
behind this observation is that the social security contributions sf and sw create a burden on wages
but not on dividends.
Under the post-reform regime the multiplier term is
(9) Ypost  =
)1(
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Now Y can be negative or positive at feasible parameter values. Figure 1 illustrates this in the case
of a YEL owner. We observe that Y is negative at low values of te and increases with te and sf. This
means  that  for  high  MTR  entrepreneurs  the  optimal  form  of  marginal  compensation  is  dividends
and vice versa. The break point of te is 0.495 assuming sf  = 0.0445.
9Figure 1. Multiplier term Ypost at different values of te and sf  (YEL owner).
If we consider a TEL owner with sf = 0.20464 and sw = 0.0485, we observe that dividends are the
preferred form of remuneration. The break-even value of te is 0.183 which is below the flat tax rate
on earned income in the first tax bracket.
Thus the analysis implies that the marginal source of internal finance may well change in the
reform. Under the pre-reform regime it is dividends taxed as earned income and under the post-
reform regime wages or dividends, depending on the tax rate and the pension system.  In the latter
case, the marginal source of funds is excess dividend for a YEL-entrepreneur with the highest MTR
but wage income for an entrepreneur with the lower MTR.8 We will take this into account, when we
calculate the cost of capital.
8 Under both systems normal dividends are usually the tax-preferred form of remuneration. The exception is the case in
which the MTR of a YEL-entrepreneur is in either of the two lowest tax brackets under the post-reform system.
-0,14
-0,12
-0,1
-0,08
-0,06
-0,04
-0,02
0
0,02
0,04
0,3192 0,3592 0,4192 0,4792 0,5492
M TR on earned incom e, t e
Y
0,0135
0,0355
0,0445
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4 The CHC’s cost of capital
In this section we derive the CHC’s cost of capital under the Finnish dual income tax system before
and after the 2005 reform. A simple indifference condition method is applied. The analysis focuses
on the Finnish splitting system and the dividend tax changes. Because of this, depreciation rules and
some other complicating aspects of the tax code are ignored. Considerable effort is put, however,
into deriving the cost of capital for different income regimes, which are determined based on form
in which the entrepreneur withdraws his marginal income (wage income, excess dividends or
normal dividends). The type of marginal income is important since it determines how the owner is
taxed on the marginal return on investment. It is important also because under internal financing
this form of income is in fact the source from which the firm finances its investment. Thus the
income type affects not only the marginal tax rate of the return on the investment but also the
owner’s opportunity cost of capital.
4.1 Deriving the cost of capital for different regimes
Consider a CHC, owned by a single owner, investing one euro in non-depreciable fixed assets and
financing the investment by new equity or retained earnings. The firm’s cost of capital can be
derived from the following indifference condition that equates the owner’s marginal net income
after taxes, NI*, and the opportunity cost of the marginal investment to the owner, gr,
(10) rg=*NI ,
where r is the owner’s post-tax rate of return requirement on the firm’s investment and is
determined as rc)1( tr -= ,  where r depicts the required gross rate of return on equity. g is  the
market valuation of the owner’s investment in the firm.
In the case of investment financed by retained earnings, the valuation coefficient g  reflects the
differences in tax treatment of distributed profits and capital gains. To explain this, consider the use
of one euro of after-tax profits either to reinvestment in the firm or to dividends (or wages). The
former alternative generates an increase in the value of the firm’s shares. As in standard corporate
tax literature, the market price is now assumed to adjust such that the owner is indifferent as
between selling his shares and withdrawing the after-tax dividends (see King 1974, Auerbach 1979,
Sinn 1987). This means that g  can be derived from the following equation
(11) A=- gt )1( g ,
where  the  lhs  gives  the  after-tax  capital  gain  form  the  sale  of  the  shares  and  the  rhs  gives  the
owner’s after-tax income from profit distribution (dividend or wage).
Table  5  defines  the  different  income  regimes  in  the  pre-  and  post-reform  tax  systems.  There  are
three main regimes which are determined according to the type of marginal income: wage, excess
dividend or normal dividend. The two special features of the post-reform system, the 90,000 euro
threshold and the deductibility of the capital income tax from the net wealth tax, create three
additional sub-regimes for each main regime. There are thus nine different regimes in the post-
reform tax system.
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Table 5 also gives the market valuation and the effective marginal tax rates on dividends as capital
income and earned income and on net wealth under all pre- and post-reform regimes. It also
includes the effective marginal tax rate on wage income tw* which was not defined above. Observe
how the deductibility of the tax on normal dividends from the wealth tax affects the marginal tax
rates tc* and tnw*. In sub-regime b, where income tax on normal dividends is below the amount of
wealth tax, the effective tax rate on capital income is zero but on net wealth positive, tc* = 0 and
tnw* > 0. In sub-regime c the opposite applies, tc* > 0 and tnw* = 0. Observe further that in the third
regimes (Pre 3, Post 3) the valuation coefficient is affected by the taxation of wage income and not
by dividends. This is because the marginal income form is wage.
Regime Effective Marginal Tax Rate Valuation Coefficient
tc* tnw* 9 te* tw* g
Pre-reform tax system
Pre 1: Normal Dividend,
D < bN u
uc
-
-
1
t
tnw - - )1)(1(
1
g
c
u t
t
--
-
Pre 2: Excess Dividend,
D?? bN u
uc
-
-
1
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ue
-
-
1
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1
g
e
u t
t
--
-
Pre 3: Wage instead of
    Excess Dividend u
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-
1
t
tnw -
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gff
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Post-reform tax system
   Normal Dividend, D < bN,
Post 1a: bN £ 90000, 0 tnw - -
gt-1
1
Post 1b: bN > 90000 Ù
tnwaN ? 0,7tcD, 0 tnw - - gt-1
1
Post 1c: bN > 90000 Ù
tnwaN < 0,7tcD 0.7tc 0 - - g
c
t
t
-
-
1
7.01
   Excess Dividend, D?? bN,
Post 2a: bN £ 90000, 0 tnw 0.7te -
g
e
t
t
-
-
1
7.01
Post 2b: bN > 90000 Ù
tnwaN ? 0,7tcD,
0 tnw 0.7te
-
g
e
t
t
-
-
1
7.01
Post 2c: bN > 90000 Ù
tnwaN < 0,7tcD
0.7tc 0 0.7te
-
g
e
t
t
-
-
1
7.01
   Wage instead of Excess
    Dividend,
Post 3a: bN £ 90000, 0 tnw -
f
fw
s
s
+
+
1
t
)1)(1)(1(
1
gff
w
s tt
t
-+-
-
Post 3b: bN > 90000 Ù
tnwaN ? 0,7tcD, 0 tnw - f
fw
s
s
+
+
1
t
)1)(1)(1(
1
gff
w
s tt
t
-+-
-
Post 3c: bN > 90000 Ù
tnwaN < 0,7tcD 0.7tc 0 - f
fw
s
s
+
+
1
t
)1)(1)(1(
1
gff
w
s tt
t
-+-
-
Table 5. The effective marginal tax rates and valuation coefficient for retained earnings under
different income regimes.
9 Here we assume that the owner’s taxable net wealth exceeds the threshold for net wealth tax. In the opposite case the
effective tax rate tnw* is zero, of course, when bN £ 90000. As a result of the abolition of the net wealth tax from 2006
the deductibility of the capital income tax from the net wealth tax loses its meaning and the sub-regime b disappears.
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4.2 Cost of capital for retained earnings
This section derives the cost of capital on investment financed by retained earnings. The formulae
for  new  equity  financing  are  given  in  the  Appendix.  The  analysis  starts  from  the  pre-reform  tax
system.
4.2.1 The pre-reform tax system
Dividend income as the marginal source of finance
Let  us  first  look  at  the  case  of  normal  dividends  as  the  marginal  income  form.  The  owner’s  net
income after taxes is derived from conditions (1)–(4) by considering a one-unit increase in the
firm’s capital stock and assuming W = 0. We obtain
(12) aNI nwfcf
** )1()1(* tpttpt ----= .               (normal dividends)
When the withdrawn income exceeds the maximum amount of normal dividends and the owner
prefers excess dividends to wages (W = 0), the owner’s net income is
(12’) abNI nwcefef
**** )()1()1(* tttpttpt --+---= .                (excess dividends)
The pre-reform cost of capital is now derived by using equations (12) and (12’) and the relevant
coefficients from Table 5. We obtain
(13) r
gf
cndiv
re )1)(1(
1
tt
t
p
--
-
=
)1)(1(
)1(
cf
nw ua
tt
t
--
-
+  and (pre-1 regime)
(14) +
--
-
-
--
-
= br
ef
ce
gf
cediv
re )1)(1()1)(1(
1
tt
tt
tt
t
p
)1)(1(
)1(
ef
nw ua
tt
t
--
-
. (pre-2 regime)
If we ignore the last term on the rhs of condition (13), presenting the effect of wealth taxation, we
observe that the cost of capital in the pre-1 regime corresponds to the normal-type cost of capital for
an investment financed by retained earnings (see e.g. King-Fullerton 1984, Sinn 1987). As
suggested by the so-called new view of dividend taxation, the cost of capital is not affected by
dividend tax parameters. The cost of capital corresponds to the cost of capital for a widely held
corporation (WHC).
The pre-2 regime cost of capital deviates from this in an important way. While the first term equals
the first term in (13), there is, as reported earlier by Kari (1999) and Lindhe et al. (2003 and 2004),
an additional term reflecting the effects of the splitting system for the CHCs. This second term in
(14) depends on the difference between the tax rates on earned income and capital income and the
presumptive rate of return b. With a positive tax rate differential the second term lowers the cost of
capital and thus the cost of capital for the CHC is lower than for the WHC.
The last term in (13) and (14) is the effect of the net wealth tax on the cost of capital. Its value is
positive if the owner’s taxable net wealth exceeds the wealth threshold. The wealth tax terms differ
between the regimes. This is because the wealth tax liability is financed from the after-tax marginal
income, which is different in the two cases.
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Wage income as a marginal source of finance
Due to the high tax rate on wage income, the owner is likely to prefer excess dividends to wage
income as a compensation form in the pre-reform tax system (see section 3). However, here we
present the cost of capital for the wage case. This is done in order to be able to compare the pre- and
post-reform tax systems. The wage case is interesting also, because there may be other reasons for
withdrawing income as wages. The owner’s net income in the wage case is
(12’’) abb
ss
NI nwc
ff
w
f
w **)
)1)(1(
1
1(
1
1
* tt
t
t
p
t
--
-+
-
-+
+
-
= . (wages)
Using this and the relevant parameters from Table 5 we obtain
(15) +
+
-
-
+
-
-
-
--
-
--
-
= b
s
su
r
f
w
f
f
wcf
gf
cw
re
1
1
)1(
1
1
1
)1)(1(
)1)(1(
1
t
t
ttt
tt
t
p
f
w
nw
s
a
+
-
1
1 t
t
 . (pre-3 regime)
The  first  term  on  the  right  is  again  the  standard-form  cost  of  capital  for  investments  financed  by
retained earnings. The second term measures the effects of the splitting system, which now depends
on the difference between the after-tax normal dividend and the after-tax wage income. Unlike
equations (13)–(14), the tax rates are presented on pre-corporation tax profit, since the owner’s
wages and social security contributions are paid out from untaxed profit. The third term is the effect
of the net wealth tax.
4.2.2 The post-reform regime
Dividends as the marginal source of finance
The owner’s net income after taxes in the post-1 regime is obtained by using (12) and the relevant
tax parameters from table 5.  The firm’s cost of capital is now
(16) +
--
-
= r
gf
cndiv
re )1)(1(
1
tt
t
p
f
nwa
t
t
-1
   or (post-1a and 1b)
(17) r
gf
cndiv
re )1)(1(
1
tt
tp
--
-
= . (post-1c)
Again we observe that the first term is in its standard form and the new dividend tax rules have no
effect. In regime post-1c the cost of capital is unaffected by wealth tax because the deductible
income tax on normal dividends exceeds the amount of wealth tax. Thus, the owner does not pay
wealth tax on the margin. In sub-regimes post-1a and 1b the wealth tax term takes a positive value
since the owner’s marginal tax rate is positive. There is either no income tax to be deducted from
the wealth tax (post-1a) or the amount of income tax is below the amount of wealth tax (post-1b).
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When the owner prefers to withdraw income as excess dividends, the marginal net income is
obtained by using (12’) and the parameters in Table 5. The cost of capital is
(18) +
--
-
--
-
= br
ef
e
gf
cediv
re )7.01)(1(
7.0
)1)(1(
1
tt
t
tt
t
p
)7.01)(1( ef
nwa
tt
t
--
 or (post-2a and 2b)
(19) br
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ce
gf
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re )7.01)(1(
)(7.0
)1)(1(
1
tt
tt
tt
t
p
--
-
-
--
-
= . (post-2c)
The structures of the cost of capital formulae are familiar from above. The first terms correspond to
the traditional cost of capital of internal financing. So the tax treatment of the marginal
compensation form (dividends) is not reflected, as suggested by the ‘new view’ of dividend
taxation. The second terms give the effects of the splitting system. The numerators include the tax
rate differential, which is 0.7te in regimes post-2a and 2b and 0.7(te –tc) in regime post-2c. In the
first case the tax rate on normal dividends is not seen because there is no capital income tax liability
on normal dividends due to the 90,000 euro threshold or due to the deduction from the wealth tax.
In the second case (post-2c), the owner pays tax on normal dividends according to the effective rate
tc* = 0.7tc, as reflected in the formula. The third term is again the effect of the net wealth tax.
If we compare (18)–(19) to the corresponding condition (14) of the pre-reform system, we see two
primary differences. The tax rate differentials in the numerators of the second terms differ. This is
due to the dividend tax changes. The second difference concerns the change in the marginal tax rate
on excess dividends in the denominators of the second and third terms (see Table 3).
Wage income as marginal source of finance
When the owner prefers wages to excess dividends, the cost of capital can be derived from the
equation (12’’) and the effective tax rates and the valuation coefficient from Table 5. We obtain
(20) +
+
-
-
+
-
--
-
--
-
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s
r
f
w
f
f
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1
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)1(
1
1
)7.01)(1(
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p . (post-3c)
The structure of the conditions is the same as above. The main changes concern the second term. As
in (15), which considers the wage case under the pre-reform tax system, the effect of the splitting
system is presented as depending on the difference between the after-tax amounts of income as
between  normal  dividends  and  wages,  paid  out  from  one  euro  of  pre-corporation  tax  profit.  The
reason for the change is the replacement of the full imputation system by a partial double taxation of
normal dividends.
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4.3 Cost of capital under income-splitting in Finland
This section illustrates the effects of the tax reform on investment incentives by calculating the cost
of capital under the pre- and post-reform regimes. Both retained earnings and new share issues are
considered as forms of financing.10 The values of the tax parameters in Table 1 are used. The
effective tax rate on capital gains is 12 % under the pre-reform regime and 14 % under the post-
reform regime. A YEL owner with sf  = 4.45% is considered. The owner’s rate of return requirement
before taxes is 7%. Observe that in a neutral tax system the cost of capital equals the owner’s rate of
return requirement, 7%. This rate can be used as an efficiency norm here: a deviation of the actual
cost of capital from the norm implies a tax distortion. A lower (higher) actual cost of capital tells of
a special incentive (disincentive) created by the tax system.
Table 6 presents calculations of the cost of capital for retained earnings. The tax reform lowers the
cost of capital slightly – by 0.1 per cent point – if normal dividends are the marginal source of
financing.  This  decrease  is  the  result  of  two  opposing  changes.  The  cut  in  the  corporate  tax  rate
reduces the cost of capital (see equations (13) and (16)), while the increase in the capital gains tax
rate  pushes  it  up.  In  both  pre  and  post-reform  systems  the  cost  of  capital  is  above  the  neutrality
norm, which tells of a tax disincentive. We observe that the 90,000 euro threshold does not affect
the cost of capital. This is consistent with the new view of dividend taxation, which suggests that
taxation of distributed income does not influence the cost of capital under internal financing.
Where the marginal source of finance is excess dividends or wages, the change depends on the
marginal tax rate (MTR)11 and also on whether the 90,000 euro threshold is exceeded in the post-
reform system or not. At the highest MTR the cost of capital stays very low, close to zero. Thus, as
reported earlier by Kari (1999) and Lindhe et al. (2003 and 2004), there seems to be a strong
investment incentive in the Finnish tax system in such a case. At lower levels of MTR the cost of
capital may decrease considerably. The reason for this latter outcome is that where normal
dividends are below 90,000 euros, the gap between the effective tax rates on earned income and
capital income is wider in the new system than in the old one (see Tables 3 and 4). These results are
also applicable when the owner pays wealth tax on the margin. Thus we can conclude that, despite
the tightening of dividend taxation, the incentives to invest are made stronger in most of the cases
cited in Table 6. Observe that also at low and medium levels of MTR the cost of capital is in most
cases below the neutrality norm of 7%. Thus, the special investment incentives created by the
splitting system do not only concern a narrow group of high MTR entrepreneurs. The cost of capital
is also below the cost of capital for the WHC (marked bold in the tables).
Similar conclusions apply to the case of new share issues (Table 7). If excess dividends are the
marginal income form, however, the reductions in the cost of capital are smaller than in Table 6. If
the 90,000 euro threshold is exceeded, the rise in the cost of capital is higher than in Table 6.  The
latter result implies that the reform reduces wealthy individual investors’ incentives to provide new
outside equity to CHCs.
10 The cost of capital for investment financed by debt is in fact 7 per cent in both tax systems assuming that the owner’s
rate of return requirement (7 per cent) corresponds to the market interest rate. This result assumes of course that the
asset is non-depreciable or that the depreciation for taxation purposes equals the economic depreciation.
11 The calculations make the simplifying assumption that the tax code changes do not affect the owner’s MTR on earned
income.
16
Marginal Income Form
Excess Dividend, D > bN, (.) as Wage
Marginal Tax Rate on Earned Income
Net Wealth
Tax
Regime
Normal Dividend,
D £ bN,
31.92 35.92 41.92 47.92 54.92
4.4
(6.3)
3.8
(5.4)
2.9
(3.9)
1.8
(2.0) 0.32
Post-reform
£ 90 000 €
     > 90 000 € 7.9
7.5
(9.0)
7.0
(8.3)
6.2
(7.1)
5.4
(5.6) 4.2
No Net
Wealth
Tax
(in the
margin)
Pre-reform 8.0 7.4 6.5 5.0 3.1 0.2
Post-reform12
£ 90 000 €
     > 90 000 € 8.2
4.8
(6.6)
4.3
(5.8)
3.3
(4.3)
2.3
(2.5) 0.85
Net Wealth
Tax
(in the
margin)
Pre-reform 8.3 7.8 6.9 5.4 3.6 0.8
Table 6. The cost of capital for retained earnings (%).
Marginal Income Form
Excess Dividend, D > bN, (.) as Wage
Tax Rate on Earned Income
Net Wealth Regime
Normal Dividend
D £ bN,
31.92 35.92 41.92 47.92 54.92
6.8
5.3
(6.1)
5.0
(5.7)
4.6
(5.0)
4.1
(4.2)  3.5
Post-reform
£ 90 000 €
     > 90 000 € 8.5
8.3
(8.8)
8.2
(8.6)
8.0
(8.2)
7.7
(7.8)  7.3
No Net
Wealth
Tax
(in the
margin)
Pre-reform 7.0 6.7 6.3 5.6 4.6 3.3
Post-reform12
£ 90 000 €
     > 90 000 € 7.1
5.7
(6.5)
5.4
(6.1)
5.0
(5.5)
4.6
(4.7)  4.0
Net Wealth
Tax
(in the
margin)
Pre-reform 7.4 7.1 6.7 6.0 5.2 3.9
Table 7. The cost of capital for new equity issues (%).
12 The abolition of the net wealth tax from 2006 removes this regime.
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Under the pre-reform regime the cost of capital for new equity issues is in most cases lower than
that for retained earnings. The reform makes internal financing the preferred form of financing,
especially in the case of excess dividends or wages as the marginal income form. The reason for the
change is the abandonment of the full imputation system.
The net wealth tax raises the cost of capital by 0.3–0.6 percentage points, if paid on the margin.
Observe that there is no difference in the cost of capital between the cases above and below the
90,000 euro threshold, if net wealth tax is paid on the margin. This is because the tax credit leads to
a zero marginal tax rate on capital income in sub-regime b (see section 4.1). The effect of the
deductibility of income tax from wealth tax on the cost of capital is in fact important, about 3–4
percentage points, which can be seen by comparing the post-reform figures between the cases of
“no net wealth tax, >90 000€” and  “net wealth tax included”.
Chapter 3 made the point that it may be more advantageous to withdraw income as wage income
than excess dividends under the post-reform regime. In Tables 6 and 7 the figures in brackets give
the cost of capital for the case in which wages are the preferred form of compensation. Perhaps
contrary to expectations, when we allow for this tax planning, we obtain higher values for the cost
of capital. This is because the tax rate differential between earned income and capital income is
smaller for wage income than for excess dividends. This is due to the lower marginal tax rate of
wage income. From the lower tax rate differential follows that the special investment incentive
created by the splitting system and reflected in the second terms of formulae (18)–(22) becomes
smaller. Thus the tax planning opportunity dampens the effects of the dividend tax changes on the
cost of capital.13
13 In fact – not analysed explicitly here – a dampening occurs also in the case of normal dividends exceeding 90 000
euro. According to our calculations the cost of capital is increased from 7.0 to 8.5 for the investment financed by a new
share issue. If the owner utilises the tax planning opportunity, the cost of capital decreases to 7.7 and 8.2 on the level of
two lowest MTRs. Now the tax planning lowers the cost of capital, since the effect of the tax rate difference does not
exist.
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5 Summary
This paper addresses effects of the Finnish corporate and capital income tax reform, effective as of
2005, on the investment incentives of a closely held company (CHC). The main changes in the
reform are the abandoning of the full imputation system and the introduction of a partial dividend
relief. Other elements are reductions in tax rates and the exemption of capital gains from sales of
shares in corporate taxation. There are also reductions in net wealth taxation.
Before analysing the effect of the reform on the firm’s cost of capital, we look at how the reform
affects entrepreneurial tax planning. We do this because changes in tax planning may have
important repercussions on investment incentives. In terms of tax planning measures, we focus on
the owner’s choice between different compensation forms viz. dividends and wages. While there
are in practice other ways to withdraw funds or benefits from the firm, these two forms are probably
the most important ones, especially from the point of view of marginal forms of income.
The analysis shows that under the pre-reform regime the entrepreneur prefers excess dividends to
wages as the form of compensation. This is firstly due to the full imputation system, which
eliminates entirely the double taxation of dividends, and secondly due to social security
contributions, which are imposed on wages but not on dividends. Under the post-reform regime,
wages may be the preferred way to withdraw income from the CHC. This is especially true at low
MTRs on earned income and where the employer’s social security contributions are paid at a low
rate.
The burden on withdrawn wage created by social security contributions depends on which pension
system the entrepreneur belongs to, the employees’ pension system (TEL) or the self-employed
persons’ pension system (YEL). In the case of a YEL entrepreneur, the social security contribution
rate on actual wages is very low since most of the liability is based on the so-called YEL wage,
which is a fixed lump-sum wage, contracted at the time the firm joined the pension system, and has
no direct connection to actual wages. Thus we conclude that, for investments financed by retained
earnings, the marginal source of funds is excess dividends under the pre-reform regime and, in the
case of a YEL owner, wage income at low levels of earned income and excess dividends at higher
income levels.
Our analysis indicates that the reform increases the complexity of the tax system. This is seen in our
analysis from the increase in the number of different regimes within each of which the cost of
capital is determined differently.
Our cost-of-capital calculations imply that, in most cases, the reform lowers the cost of capital for
investments and especially those financed by retained earnings. This is mostly due to the increased
tax rate difference between the effective MTR on earned income and the MTR on capital income.
Using reasonable assumptions on the owner’s rate of return requirement, the cost of capital of most
CHC’s seems to be below the required return. This means that the post-reform system encourages
internally financed growth for most CHC’s.
The incentives to invest to the CHCs are higher than to the WHCs too. The owner’s opportunity to
choose wages instead of excess dividends dampens the decrease in the cost of capital. This is due to
the decreased tax rate difference. The deduction of capital income tax from wealth tax reduces the
cost of capital in an important way. The MTR on capital income would be effective and increase the
cost of capital without the deduction.
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However, especially for new equity issues, the reform increases the cost of capital in some cases.
The rise is substantial in cases where the owner withdraws normal dividends in excess of the 90,000
euro threshold and the deduction from wealth tax does not eliminate this tax burden. This implies
that the reform reduces wealthy individual investors’ incentives to provide new outside equity to
CHCs.
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Appendix. The cost of capital for new equity issues
When a marginal investment is financed by a new equity issue, the valuation coefficient takes the
value g = 1. The cost of capital is derived in exactly the same way as above. The differences of the
cost of capital are in the first terms of the formulas and they are due to the valuation coefficient.
The pre-reform regime
The owner distributes marginal income as dividends:
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The owner withdraws excess dividend income as wages:
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The post-reform regime
The owner distributes income as normal dividends:
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The owner distributes income as excess dividends:
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The owner withdraws excess dividend income as wages:
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